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Abstract
A field is judged by the questions it addresses.  We believe that the i-field is at a critical juncture that is  
defined by increasing standards for profound, value-added insight as technology becomes more ubiquitous.  
While we see value in focusing on the "I" more than the "T" in IT, we believe that profound insight will only 
come through a deeper understanding of the intersection among human beings, information and technology.  
We see the basic goal of our field as helping to facilitate interactions among individuals, groups and 
"information" through more informed design of technology.  We assume that human beings are 
fundamentally social beings and both information and technology to be artifacts of human experience 
proffered in the spirit of collaborating.  We begin with a discussion of collaborating and communicating 
behaviors which are inherently linguistic (broadly cast) and - we believe, by definition - functional in nature.  
This position is logically prior to artifacts or any technology associated with the creation, dissemination,  
storage, retrieval or other processing of “information.”  We argue, for example, that it is insufficient for our 
field to bound a domain after artifacts are created – we must become engaged in the creation of artifacts,  
specifying how the artifact will be useful to the user (either at present or in the future), and for which 
problems/situations the artifact is pertinent.  If one assumes an active user focused on addressing their own 
needs as well as those of others--as opposed to a more passive stance generally made by many of the 
traditional behavioral fields--then insight into artifact creation, use and re-use will not only result in 
profound insights into the human condition, but more informed system design.  We humbly invite you to 
collaborate with us in this endeavor.  We feel that it is not only critical to intensify this discussion, but both 
timely and necessary.
Introduction
In the twelve years since the introduction of the World Wide Web (April, 1995), we have 
seen dramatic changes in technology that have allowed for a plethora of collaborative 
environments and new means for communicating to emerge.  This, in turn, has generated a 
plethora of new artifacts that we call “information.”   These technological artifacts are a 
direct result of specific and ubiquitous human behaviors manifesting themselves in 
seemingly distinctive ways.  These changes increased the salience of a set of formidable 
and—we argue—distinguishing phenomena our field is now addressing.  This paper is a 
preliminary attempt to re-frame the discussion about our (broadly cast) collective research 
agenda around these phenomena.    
Vannevar Bush (1945) posited the ultimate information retrieval mechanism, which he 
called the “memex.”  Memex organized content in a collection based on “associative 
indexing.”   In his view, “associative indexing” would permit retrieval based on association 
and context rather than strict categorical indexing.  Bush’s efforts have been seen as the 
conceptual framework for subsequent work on hypertext, which is the central data 
metaphor for the digital age.   We view this as a good example of a technological focus 
absent insights into human or user behavior.  For example, Bush did not specify the nature 
of the associations among nodes in the hypertext.  We believe that functional associations 
between what information is about and how the information might help a user is a logical 
source of insight into Bush’s associations.  In other words, we believe that the source of the 
association that Bush alluded to is at the intersection of the information artifact and its 
benefit, or derived use.  The purpose of this paper, however, is not to specifically criticize 
or extend Bush’s ideas or to recast general ideas about a research agenda that is more about 
the “I” then the “T” in IT.  Rather, we wish to raise the question of whether or not moving 
the focus to the “I” is going far enough to define our field in such a way that it will lend 
insight into fundamental issues like those brought up by Bush over 60 ago.  
Our intent is to explore the beginnings of a coherent conceptual framework that is derived 
from a fundamental understanding of what leads human beings to collectively create, use 
and re-use our experience when addressing life’s challenges.  We assume that these 
collaborating behaviors are fundamental to being human and are exhibited by people 
communicating experiences and understandings with each other.  These fundamental 
behaviors inevitably result in constructed artifacts that are necessarily constrained by the 
funtionality of technologies designed to generate, access and disseminate information.  We 
believe that the i-field is uniquely positioned and capable of gaining profound insight into 
these fundamental behaviors only if we adopt a truly interdisciplinary stance that 
incorporates the “I,” the “T” and the “H” (i.e., the human being) when trying to understand 
the whys and hows of creating, using and re-using information.  
In a recent article which surveys the two seemingly definitive areas of “Information 
Science” (exemplified by the Journal of the American Society for Information Science and 
Technology ) and “Information Systems”  (exemplified by the Journal of Information 
Systems Research), Sawyer and Huang (2007) put forth the following: 
We speculate that scholars in [information systems research] need to be more 
explicit about its basic constructs (even to the simple level of articulating the range 
of possible ways to characterize these basic constructs) to more easily connect to, 
and to be understood by, other disciplines  (Sawyer & Huang 2007: 1444).
Sawyer and Huang (2007) seek to find common ground among researchers within the 
fields of Information Science and Information Systems.  Their purpose is to gain some 
insight into how scholars might increase collaboration both within and between fields. 
Additionally, they are interested in better understanding how to build bridges between 
these fields and others.   We believe that their interest in gaining insight into these 
collaborating behaviors actually illustrates the “basic constructs” they seek.  We do not 
view this as a coincidence given they are “IS” researchers who have positioned themselves 
within the larger “i–field,” which we view as being composed of—at least—Information 
Science, Information Systems and Library Science researchers.   We posit that those who 
view themselves as being tied to the i–field share a common interest in collaborating 
behaviors and technologies that support these behaviors (see how we define our broad use 
of the term “collaborating” below) and that these interests converge on phenomena 
associated with these behaviors that characterize the field.  It seems that it is an interest in 
these phenomena and these technologies from which all inquiries into the IT artifact, IT 
per se, individual, social or organizational processes, representation, retrieval, transfer, etc. 
emerge.  We suggest that the increase in the salience of these characterizing phenomena are 
a direct result of using technology to communicate and collaborate at all levels of an 
increasingly intertwined global environment.  
Further, we suggest that one of the profound impacts of IT is not derived merely from its 
wide scale adoption, but from the resultant increase in salience of collaborating behaviors 
embedded within every social environment.  For example, we are now able to point directly 
to a set of artifacts (e.g., e-mails, IM messages, blogs, etc.) written by various individuals 
who are collaborating to solve a specific problem and validly view it as evidence of a 
“team” or “community.”  Yet, not a single face-to-face interaction among their members is 
required before doing so.  Those within the i-field are uniquely positioned to explain why 
this characterization is valid and why it can be reliably made across all contexts in which 
humans interact.  Most importantly, this brings the field beyond explaining how or why 
technology enables this type of human interaction—explanations that are seemingly self-
evident to many simply because IT is becoming embedded in peoples’ daily lives and 
business process.  In other words, the fascination with technology is fading and potentially 
turning more towards an expectation of more connectivity.  Beyond the “I” and certainly 
the “T,” we believe that IT has worked to illuminate who we are as humans and that the 
emergence of the i-field is a direct result of a common interest in this.  It is insight into who 
we are (as a field) that will: 
(1) create the gravitating effect discussed by Sawyer and Huang (2007), 
(2) uniquely define what it means to be a researcher in the i-field to those in other 
fields as well as the world, and 
(3) lead to better design of systems and technology (e.g., organizing artifacts according 
to Bush’s (1945) notion of “associative indexing”) which will in turn enable those 
in the field to have a more profound impact on the world (let alone other 
disciplines).   
Our field has dedicated a great deal of time and energy examining content and its 
technology in the last fifteen years, but we believe that we must commit significant 
resources into understanding human beings and their behavior from a more functional and 
purer user-based perspective.  This perspective differs from those of many other fields 
focused solely on behavior—and potentially viewed as being focused on the user as well 
(e.g., those within the psychological, economical and political science fields)—by viewing 
the user as an active and creative participant who is actually working towards constructing 
their environment as opposed to a more passive participant merely reacting to their 
environment.  We are certainly not alone in this view (e.g., Dervin & Nilan, 1986; 
Saracevic, 1997; 1999; Sawyer & Huang, 2007).
There are many ways to re-frame our research agenda.  One is to conceptualize the artifacts 
that we call information as byproducts of various attempts by human beings to collaborate 
and share experiences with each other.  Some already under way include applying pre-
digital solutions to digital content (e.g., meta language classification of web pages), others 
are uniquely digital solutions (e.g., natural language processing for “filtering”) and still 
others are a blend of the pre-digital and digital (e.g., folksonomies).  We offer a perspective 
that has emerged out of a juxtaposition of the so-called “user-based,” cognitive and social 
cognitive approaches (Nilan & D’Eredita, 2005; D’Eredita & Nilan, 2007) and believe that 
it also works to illustrate the focus of inquiry discussed above.  
What follows is strictly an illustration of how we frame our research within the i-field as 
discussed above.  It is important to note that we do not view the perspective we put forth 
below as exemplary of the i-field.  We believe that the common ground we share with all i-
field researchers is in our overarching assumption of an active user and our interest in 
collaborating behaviors and how to realize the potential of IT to support these behaviors. 
It is from our interest in collaborating behaviors that we believe we can begin a dialogue 
with any researcher considered to be part of the i-field as well as those who are not. 
Below, we put forth the foundation of our research on collaborating behaviors.   We 
differentiate ourselves from other researchers within the field by relating information to 
human collaborating about specific situations or problems (discussed below).  It is also 
important to note, that our anchoring curiosity in specific types of collaborating behaviors 
allows us (a linguist and cognitive psychologist by “trade”) to work in a complementary 
and fulfilling manner.  From our perspective, our “home disciplines” only add perspective 
to the more important common phenomena in which we are interested in gaining insight.   
It is in the spirit of collaborating that we present this paper.  Our primary motivation is to 
see if others are able to frame their research within a field focused on all aspects of human 
collaborating behaviors.  We begin by defining key terms relevant to our own research 
agenda, but seemingly relevant to a number of others as well.  We then discuss how our 
agenda has and continues to unfold over time and how it relates back to the i-field-specific 
themes discussed at the beginning of the paper.  Given our discussion above about the 
field, we continue with some discussion on the nature of our inquiry into collaborative 
behaviors in order to give a sense of the flavor of our discussion.  
Our Anchoring Definitions
“Collaborating” is the social coordination (largely communicative) through which human 
beings observe their environment and solve problems/address their life situations. 
Conceptually, Carter’s (1980) “social Darwinian” description of human existence 
argues that humans have an observing and a moving capability.  Those individuals 
who observe and move effectively will prosper.  Through collaborating, individuals 
can substantially improve their individual observing and moving capabilities.  Two 
heads are better than one; together we are stronger.  It is through linguistic 
communicating this basic social stance is manifest, i.e., we inform one another to our 
mutual benefit.  The artifacts we generate in this communicative process, however 
distorted by structure (e.g., publication or broadcasting constraints) is what we have 
been calling “information” (further defined below). 
“User-based” refers to an epistemic position (i.e., what can be known about being human) 
that validates the reality of human beings as they perceive it as a foundation for the design 
of systems (e.g., a series of steps intended to solve a human problem/situation/ context 
which may or may not involve reification of some or all of the steps as “technology”). 
There is currently a great deal of misunderstanding about user-based where some believe 
that we need to understand the users per se (i.e., the so-called “individual differences” 
approaches) in order to fulfill our research agenda.  However, we believe we need to focus 
on the users only within the situations/problems that work to both motivate and engage 
human collaborative and communicative behaviors and in some cases, only the 
situations/problems in which users are engaged.  
“Problem” (Taylor, 1986; Nilan, 1992) or “situation” (Dervin, 1983; 2001; Dervin & Nilan, 
1986) is the time/space context for human cognitive behavior.  These are very broad terms, 
not to be confused with the much narrower “problem solving” notions from cognitive 
psychology, management, etc.  In essence, the terms refer to a “chunk” of time/space about 
which people collaborate/communicate and ultimately the focus of system design – helping 
users share and create meaning to address their situations/solve their problems through 
access to resources (information/data; computing functionalities; links to others, e.g., 
experts).  
“Language” is the means through which human beings create and exchange meaning.  This 
is accomplished through a series of co-focusing, co-orienting, and collaborating behaviors 
(Kim, 2003) which serve to orient one person’s context to the other’s.  Following the so-
called “Prague Functionalists,” a unit of meaning has two necessary components in this 
orienting process:  “Topic,” or what I am talking about and “Comment,” or how the topic at 
hand “fits” my context (i.e., problem/situation and any associated goals or envisioned end 
states) (Jakobson, 1963).  Meaning is therefore, not exchanged per se but is converged 
upon over an iterated series of utterances over time.  Language as we are defining the 
concept has nothing to do with the difference between Chinese Mandarin and American 
English.  Rather, language is an extremely broad concept that encompasses all manner of 
expressing relationship, existence and movement and it is much more than merely a tool. 
Language is employed to orient other people, one to the other (whether in a disclosure 
sense or in a deceptive sense), orient other people to a specific context (time/space bound 
problem/ situation, i.e., topic), and/or to specify individual experience with that context in 
terms of values, perceptions of situational conditions, goals or end states (i.e., comment).  
“Information” is a resource which (we assume) helps the human(s) involved in addressing 
a problem/situation facilitate progress towards her/his/their desired goal or end state. 
[Note:  “facilitate” implies constraint to perception of the environment and/or perception of 
movement possibilities and consequences.  A resource that facilitates may not necessarily 
be empowering, it may also be inhibiting while a constraint may not necessarily be 
inhibiting, it may also help to facilitate “cognitive movement” (defined below)].  All 
information is bound by the context in which the collaborating occurs.  For example, a 
textbook by an expert in Alzheimer’s disease may contain insight to help me deal with a 
friend with the disease but it is buried in a book which was structurally constrained to fit a 
15-week educational program.  Since the small bit of information that might help me is not 
part of an actual conversation between me and the author, it is extremely difficult for me to 
find – there are no co-focusing or co-orienting features in the text linking me, the reader, to 
the writer and scarce opportunity for this to ever occur.   Even when we observe two people 
in conversation as they collaborate on one or the other’s situation/problem, there is much 
that is not articulated (because it is already understood) that the outside observer has no 
access to which renders any technological recording of the interaction necessarily 
incomplete.   Similarly, technological artifacts are necessarily incomplete expressions of 
context and, therefore, inadequate representations of the problem/situation from the 
perspective of either person involved.  This in turn presents a difficulty when we seek to 
access and re-use the artifacts, especially when they are “located” in a huge “pile” of other 
inadequate representations.  Note that we can posit a continuum of information artifacts, 
from an artifact addressing how to make a chocolate cake (for example) where there may 
be many possible contexts where a chocolate cake is appropriate, to an artifact addressing 
the nature of Alzheimer’s disease where the help needed by a patient is likely to be 
different than the help needed by a relative of the patient.  In neither case is the user’s 
context likely to be present in the information artifact itself—albeit a seemingly more 
profound issue in the case of Alzheimer’s disease. 
“Cognitive movement” is a central metaphor in Dervin’s (1983) Sense-Making which is 
employed to describe the human experience of being alive over time.  In this metaphor, 
experiencing life is described as taking steps (mentally as well as perhaps physically) 
through problems/situations, sometimes concurrently (although not simultaneously) or 
serially.  Cognitive movement invariably implies emotive steps.  Cognitive movement is 
one of two central concepts in the user-based approach we put forth in this paper.  It is 
inseparably tied to the concept of problem/situation.  
“Uncertainty” (Carter, 1980) refers to the aspects of an individual’s (or individuals’) 
perceptions of a problem/situation that are not already pre-determined.  Since change (in 
self, others, environment and problem/situation) is pervasive, uncertainty is always (except 
with reflexive and habitual behavior) an aspect of human perception.  Dervin (1983) refers 
to a “gap” to represent the uncertainty inherent in an individual’s perception of her/his 
position relative to that individual’s movement through the situation/problem/ context at 
hand.  When uncertainty is perceived by the individual, s/he can attempt to resolve the 
uncertainty by sharing meaning or creating meaning through collaborating with others 
(either directly through conversation or indirectly through artifacts of past conversations).   
From a monadic perspective, “meaning” describes the sense that an individual makes of 
aspects of the environment inherent in her perception of her problem/situation in terms of 
her understanding of the environment and/or her movement relative to that environment to 
reach her goal or end state.  This meaning is based on past experience and certainly based 
on past and present conversations with others (either direct or vicarious).  In this way, 
meaning can be seen as the creation of new “sense” (Dervin, 1983) about “how to bridge 
the gap” (i.e., addressing uncertainty), it can also be seen as the creative re-interpretation of 
old meaning to “fit” new situational conditions.  Although meaning is created directly by 
experiencing a problem/situation, experience can also be vicarious – experienced indirectly 
through observing others.  A dyadic (or larger) model of sense making can help to guide 
our efforts because the observing of others’ experiences and behaviors is realized through 
conversing with others about the specific context given specific “comments.”  Such 
“comments” are rare in most formal artifacts but comprise the bulk of the verbiage in a 
conversation (see Yoon & Nilan, 1999).  This has become even more evident in our digital, 
post Web world.  From birth, individuals are enmeshed in a collaborative network of others 
who attempt to help the individuals observe and move effectively through collaborative 
communicating.  All communicating is through language grounded in individual 
experience (direct or vicarious) and meaning is created by the similarities and differences 
among individual experiences.  Much meaning (some, i.e., structural views – e.g., Giddens 
(1991), Bordieu (1999) – would say “all” meaning) is perpetuated over time through 
pervasive structurational (e.g., historical, cultural) constraint and extended experience with 
a situation/problem (or group of related situations/problems).  [Note:  “communicating” 
does not necessarily result in the rare phenomenon of “communication” (Carter, 1980).  So 
communicating only implies the attempt to share experience and orientation, not the result]. 
One point of the foregoing is that explicit comments in an artifact (which is much more 
likely in a conversation than a formal publishing or broadcasting artifact) allow a 
subsequent user to quickly determine whether the artifact will be of any use to him/her.   
“Knowledge” refers to experience with a specific problem/situation or set of related 
problems/situations (D’Eredita and Barreto, 2006).    We assume the following in regard to 
knowledge (D’Eredita and Barreto, 2006: 1824): 
1. The nature of knowledge is episodic, thus personal, situation-/problem-specific and 
acquired through experience, i.e., there is no abstract or non-contextualized product 
“stored” somewhere in the brain.
2. Experience results from the construction and relating of episodes, but does not 
necessarily result in specifically “intended” knowledge. 
3. The proliferation of experience by individuals within a social context (e.g., dyad, 
group, team, organization, community, etc.) is the result of constructive and 
collaborative communicating behaviors by which two or more individuals 
collectively focus attention, thus collectively construct relatable episodes—from the 
perspective of both the intra- and interpersonal. 
Logan (1988) defines an episode as follows: 
Processing episodes consist of the goal the subject was trying to attain, the 
stimuli encountered in pursuit of that goal, the interpretation given to the 
stimuli with respect to the goal, and the response made to the stimulus 
(Logan 1988: 495).  
To paraphrase Logan’s quote in Dervin’s (1983) terms, making sense of a situation 
involves the goal or end state that the individual has in mind, the situational conditions as 
perceived and interpreted by the individual as s/he moves through the situation, and the 
cognitive behaviors (especially those that serve to collaborate and to communicate with 
others) that the individual takes to move towards his/her goal.  This entire “chunk” of time 
and space (i.e., episode) is the context which is the central focus of user-based research put 
forth in this paper.  That we do this by collaborating and communicating (via language) 
with others implies that the constructed “meaning” is tied to social cognitive behaviors 
among individuals.  
This is very similar to sense-making from the perspective of Carl Weick (albeit more 
specific): 
The process of sensemaking is intended to include the construction and bracketing 
of the text-like cues that are interpreted, as well as the revision of those 
interpretations based on action and its consequences.  Sensemaking is about 
authoring as well as interpretation, creation as well as discovery (Weick 1995: 8).  
Overlap among episodes allows for a stream of discrete episodes to result in a seemingly 
fluid flow of experience.  We would not be able to make sense of our experiences if this 
was not true (Weick, 1995).  For example, D’Eredita and Barreto (2006: 1829) suggest the 
following:      
1. A new episode might be associated (individually and collectively) with previous 
episodes because of similar qualities as defined above.  That there is some type of 
incongruity results in the most obvious need for sensemaking (Weick, 1995).  It 
presents the need for constructing a potentially unique episode that is congruent 
enough for it to be associated with past episodes; or, for it to make sense.  This is 
not an abstraction, but a direct comparison made through human-cognitive 
behaviors.  Episodes are explicitly related or not explicitly related in some manner. 
In the latter case, previous episodes, however, most likely continue to indirectly 
influence behavior whether individuals are aware of this influence or not (Reder, 
1996).  
2. On the other hand, a new episode might reinforce a previous experience because of 
similar qualities.  Here, one can assume a high probability that newly constructed 
episodes will be related to past episodes.  Unlike the previous case, the amount of 
effort required to make sense of an episode is minimal, thus allowing for specific 
stimulus-response behavior to be optimally reinforced (Wyer, 1997).   
3. A new episode might also fall between the two extremes.  This is perhaps the gray 
area in which one is said to rely upon previous experience with similar episodes/ 
situations/problems referenced by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) in their view of 
tacit knowledge.  Here, one is simply afforded the chance to do less sensemaking 
than in the first case presented while also being able to leverage an array of 
previous episodes that are functionally (or not) similar in quality.  
Note that Bordieu’s (1999) notion of “habitus” can help us understand scenarios two and 
three above.  Habitus refers to familiarity with a particular situation/problem (through 
experience) such that the resources of the individual are more oriented towards the present 
uncertainty of situational conditions that are out of the ordinary (e.g., have changed since 
the last time the person has addressed the situation/problem).  This is not to be confused 
with “habit” which is a reflexive behavior (non-reflective) (Cohen, 2007).  
To juxtasupose all of the above with ideas presented by D’Eredita and Barreto (2006): 
A robust cognitive and social cognitive set of behaviors emerges if we assume 
experience is episodic and is the construction of and relationship among episodes. 
This allows individuals to be practical and “reliable” (Weick & Roberts, 1993) in 
regard to behavior …   Episodes may be constructed given a specific problem, but 
not necessarily in a manner that makes them representative of an array of potential 
contingencies (D’Eredita and Barreto, 2006: 1829).   
This leads us to assume the following in regard to episodes, ergo experience (see D’Eredita 
and Barreto, 2006, for a more complete discussion on these assumptions which are a 
juxtaposition of assumptions from a perspective representative of the field of cognitive 
psychology, particularly that of Logan (1988), with that of an i-field perspective): 
1. The constructing and relating of experience is episodic:  Each episode is associated 
with one or more previous episodes, but is constructed as a separate co-occurrence. 
2. Constructing new episodes is obligatory upon attention:  That which is attended to 
is automatically perceived and embedded within the context of a given episode.
3. Relating to previous episodes is obligatory upon attention:  Previous experience 
directly impacts behavior if a current situational condition is attended to and is 
associated with previous episodes in some way.  
“Memory” refers to the ability of human beings to associate present situational conditions 
with perceptions of past situational conditions relative to the current episode.  The 
associating is not exact, so we see limitations in the objectiveness of human memory and 
we certainly should consider the individual’s criteria employed for associating as inexact. 
The extent to which the associating is based on “habitus” or inherited criteria and logic 
represents increased likelihood that associations made for evolving uncertainty in 
situational conditions in the present and future will not be up to the task.  It is important to 
note that while our perspective is cognitively slanted, our notion of episode (given its 
relationship to problem/situation) applies to context and both individual and social 
behavior.  It is at this point in which we—if we have yet to do so—radically diverge from 
traditional cognitive theory.  
We further diverge by suggesting that any notion of “storage” in relation to “memory” is 
misleading.  Our epistemological stance places the individual in the present and notions of 
“past” and “future”—thus time—as cognitive constructs that facilitate sense-making  from 
a functional perspective.   Simply put, we are not comfortable assuming the world is as it 
“seems” to be, but rather how the world seems to be is functionally similar to “how it is.” 
We assume that the nexus of the cognitive behaviors described above is that of a 
neurological functioning organ—the brain.  The physical foundation from which more 
abstract cognizing emerges is assumed to be in a constant state of change as it interacts 
with the world.   It is because of this that we see no need to accept notions of “memory” 
like that adopted from a (computer-based) information-processing perspective.  While we 
assume experience is “bounded” in the episodic manner discussed above and that each 
episode is processed as separate co-occurrence, we do not assume that these episodes are 
“stored” in this manner waiting to be “retrieved” or “recalled” at a latter time.  We view 
behavior as resulting from cognitive behaviors that have been shaped by previous 
experience and as a response to a given problem given its (and an individual’s and/or 
group’s) state at a specific point in time and space. 
Further, we do not assume behavior to be deterministic, albeit potentially implied given 
what has been said thus far.  We view behavior as being tied to experience in a 
probabilistic manner and to current constraints imposed by one’s interpretation of the 
problem (which is also relatively uncertain and probabilistic in nature).  More experience 
implies that the individual or group has a better chance of usefully, or functionally 
choosing, or creating steps that facilitate individual or group progress towards the desired 
goal or end state.  “Expert,” as its etymological roots imply, refers to one who has 
experience.  Culturally we have cast experts as the ones who can most effectively and 
efficiently respond to a specific problem by choosing or creating appropriate steps. 
However, experience is based on past uncertainty rather than present or future uncertainty. 
This past orientation may potentially limit the expert in dealing effectively and efficiently 
with emerging new situational conditions.  
“Creativity” refers to an individual perceiving or taking steps that are beyond his/her 
existing (direct or vicariously “inherited”) experience with the problem/situation at hand. 
As such, it is different from a judgment made externally, e.g., a “creative” work.  Given the 
necessary association with the problem/situation at hand, we view creativity as being best 
conceptualized as a time/space bound cognitive behavior rather than a personality-level 
characteristic of the individual.  The issue for researchers and managers thus changes from 
identifying “creative individuals” to identifying creative perceiving or step taking given the 
current collective experience available (e.g., Weisberg, 1993).  
“Community” refers to the (direct and vicarious) communicating among individuals 
engaging with or involved in addressing uncertainty in one or more problems/situations. 
Humans are social creatures whose development begins (usually) in “families” and is 
subsequently nurtured in extra-familial sub-communities (e.g., schools, religious activities, 
etc.) which serve to broaden the individual human’s perspectives from an existential self-
centeredness towards (the inclusion at least) a more social- or network-centric focus. 
Community is defined by the range of situations/problems with which the collective is 
engaged.  “Organization” differentiates itself from a more emerging community in that it 
has already organized—albeit in some cases continuously adapting in order—to address a 
distinctive set of problems.  In this sense, the more formal structure of an organization 
becomes more of a constraint (as discussed above) when compared to the more informal 
structure of a community.  This is not meant to imply that community or organization are 
simply less or more developed forms of the same social entity.  However, we do mean to 
imply some overlap in that they are a direct—albeit not exclusive—result of fundamental 
collaborative behaviors yoked by a set of common problems.  
Below, we discuss how our agenda has and continues to unfold over time and how it relates 
back to the i-field-specific themes discussed at the beginning of the paper.  
A Research Agenda Characteristic of the i-field 
Constraints are logically tied to the problem/situation at hand and the more micro 
situational conditions that serve to contextualize the communicating behaviors which 
includes any potential IT (D’Eredita & Nilan, 2007).  If we as researchers move from an 
individual-as-unit perspective to something that includes a more time/space bound 
problem-as-unit as well as the embedded, and even more micro, cognitive step-as-unit 
perspective, we might make some headway in understanding and managing the changes 
that impact our field’s objective of providing access to resources.  {Note: there is an even 
more micro unit of analysis common in the Sense-Making research of Dervin and her 
colleagues (e.g., Dervin, 2003) which is the “gap” which facilitates inquiry into very 
specific information and resource use, resource evaluation, etc.  A “gap” is usually 
operationalized as questions that a respondent has in her/his mind at a particular cognitive 
step.  A separate unit of analysis is needed for this fine-grain issue because multiple gaps 
are possible at any specific step}.  
As a field, we seek to create or discover patterns that serve to guide our organization of 
resources which in turn, must guide information seekers in locating resources for 
subsequent re-use.  We argue that patterns which are derived from the technological 
artifacts as we find them are ineffective in facilitating either appropriate levels of 
agreement in classification of artifacts or retrieval by users (who we know won’t “read the 
manual”).  The technology that produces the artifacts provides no insight into the logic of 
this organizing/retrieving endeavor whatsoever, it is a human behavior that ultimately 
dictates the function of any organizational scheme.  Therefore, to the extent to which we 
can find patterns (i.e., similar actions and sequences of actions, rationales, values, 
descriptions, behaviors, etc.) in the way people collaborate and communicate about their 
problems/situations, we can examine these patterns to see if they can be employed 
effectively for the organizing and subsequent retrieval of artifacts.  There is some evidence 
that indeed, they can be so employed (e.g., Nilan, 1992; Yoon & Nilan, 1999; Nilan & 
Mundkur, 2007).  We argue that these same patterns may be suitable for organizing non-
traditional resources that our current approaches to the organizing/ retrieval dilemma do not 
accommodate (e.g., maps, images, people, places, etc.).   After all, these patterns represent 
the universal “habitus” of human survival through collaborating and communicating which 
is far older than the mere 4,000 years since the invention of writing.  And the patterns (e.g., 
between “topic” and “comment” or between one step and the next step) represent 
associations readily interpretable to users.  
Further, we believe that our functional understanding of these patterns will serve to inform 
our disciplinary design of systems and technology so that we can facilitate the organizing 
and retrieving of artifacts as those artifacts are generated.  Note that constraints associated 
with design should be viewed as necessarily balanced between enabling natural—and 
potentially idiosyncratic—human behavior and guidelines for effective creation and 
exchange of meaning through “information.”  For example, e-mail currently has only “To,” 
“From” and “Subject” fields.  As Yoon & Nilan (1999) suggested, these might be 
augmented with “comment” fields such as ‘how the email will help the recipient 
understand his/her problem better’ and or ‘how the email will help the recipient figure out 
what to do at this time’ and/or ‘why this email is important to the recipient.’  The focus in 
this example is on “comment” and therefore the functional associations between users’ 
views of reality and their movement through that reality.  This kind of association – 
between “topic” and “comment” – represents one fairly concrete association (of potentially 
many possible) that might enable our field to actually guide the generation of artifacts that 
incorporate Bush’s “associative indexing” as the artifacts are generated.  We believe that 
in this way our discipline could lead insightful changes to relatively ubiquitous 
technologies that would serve subsequent organizing and retrieving.  Again, this relatively 
small change would be based on insight into the fundamental collaborating behaviors 
discussed above and not the technology per se.  
Turning an Agenda into Action
While we emphasize creation, use and re-use of experiences above, here we will focus on 
only the latter two, but with the assumption that all that is discussed below is directly 
applicable to the design of systems specifically focused on the creating of information. 
Two courses of action are suggested in regard to use and re-use by the foregoing:  The first 
is to generate rich descriptions of the community-based communicating behaviors and 
subsequent cognitive behaviors (i.e., perceptions and step taking) of the individual 
community members to search for patterns.  The second is, based on these rich 
descriptions, apply our field-specific experience/”habitus” proactively to facilitate the 
direct communicating behaviors and at the same time, facilitate the effective and efficient 
use (and re-use) of vicarious experience.  Since systems (including classification/ 
organization of artifacts) have been defined above as “a series of steps designed to solve a 
human problem,” empirically derived patterns will inform us as to the selection of 
appropriate steps and sequences of steps.  We see these patterns as superlative examples of 
associative dimensions alluded to by Bush (1945).  
Based on this change in focus, the following user-based and problem/situation-based 
research agenda is proposed for the study of collaborative behaviors within communities, 
but with the assumption that a similar approach can be applied to, for example, teams:  
First we would seek to describe behaviors within the collaborative communities that 
punctuate human lives (intra-community). Rich descriptions of the communicating and 
collaborating behaviors (not merely perusal of existing technological artifacts which are, by 
definition, meaning-challenged in-and-of-themselves) and their rationales (i.e., both topic 
and comment) can be examined for evidence of patterns in: (1) effective and/or efficient 
behaviors (steps); (2) sets of behaviors, e.g., roles (but NOT as characteristics of 
individuals) as functional sequences; and  (3) reward structures and constraints that 
facilitate communicating and therefore, collaborating.  Part of our disciplinary confusion 
vis-à-vis these behaviors are like a “fish in water” scenario – we are embedded in social 
interaction and therefore find it quite difficult to posit the behaviors as an object of inquiry. 
We believe it to be an imperative initial focus of inquiry.  The flexibility of notion of 
“community” is particularly useful here because it would allow researchers to tailor their 
observations to groups with limited ranges of problems/situations (e.g., specific 
organizations or organizations focused on providing similar products or services).  This in 
turn would allow us to pursue a basic research agenda into our primary phenomena and 
provide concrete practical insight into the targeted communities.  As we pursue our rich 
descriptions, “community” as a unit of analysis will facilitate many analyses across 
different communities to get at the essence of human communicating and collaborating as 
well as experiment with various artifact creation possibilities.  
We can subsequently examine similar phenomena in the communicating among 
communities.  Of particular interest here is referrals from one community discussion to 
another – when, under what conditions, etc. given the “horizontal” communication 
engendered by the Web.  We believe that insight into this specific subset collaborative 
behaviors will be particularly useful for many information seeking scenarios in the digital 
age.
Once we have adequately described these phenomena and looked for relationships among 
behaviors and various use criteria, our collective understanding of the human perquisites 
inherent in creating, using and re-using others’ experiences we can then become 
proactively engaged in research and design of the actual production of artifacts which 
incorporate these efficiencies to facilitate appropriate vicarious re-use of the documented 
experience (e.g., adding fields to email/voicemail/texting interfaces).  This will, in turn, 
facilitate subsequent re-use of the technological artifacts in more of a conversational 
manner as opposed to the current topical “keyword” strategy.  We believe this kind of 
search interface (e.g., specify “topic” and then specify “comments” [plural employed here 
is deliberate]) will be more natural for the large majority of users – with no manual or 
knowledge of Boolean logic necessary.  In essence, this is what Yoon & Nilan (1999) 
suggested - the organization of resources (both communicative and artifactual) within and 
between problem/situation-based communities.   Over the (currently unimaginably huge) 
hypertext data store of artifacts that tomorrow’s Web will contain, we believe that this 
communicative/collaborative framework will facilitate the sharing of resources within and 
among communities, and ultimately, facilitate the effective/efficient access of individuals 
to the communities which best “fit” their individual problems/situations.  
Whether or not you subscribe to Bush’s (1945) “memex” vision, the potential power of his 
“associational indexing” to manage inherently unmanageably huge data set seems logically 
possible if we posit the associating as an extension of how human beings help each other 
make sense of and move through the sequence of situations/problems that punctuate their 
experiences.  Our position is that “meaning” is a product of human beings actively 
experiencing the world as they “move” through time and space.  As inherently social 
creatures, we attempt to share meaning linguistically (broadly cast) and generate artifacts 
through various technologies either as part of our communicating/collaborating with others 
or as an attempt to share meaning with another in the future who is in a similar situation or 
has a similar problem.  The artifacts are what we call information.  We believe that a useful 
way (if not the most useful way) to organize large numbers of such artifacts lies in the 
association between the active human being, his/her problem/situation and goal or 
envisioned end state and a co-collaborator (either in the present or in an envisioned future). 
 
In Conclusion
The Internet, and more specifically the Web, has changed the functional definition of 
community by illustrating the collapse of the geographical/spatial constraint on 
communicating.  Community implies an organizing principle more intimately tied to the 
problem/situation than to a person (or a set of people) per se, which has resulted in a 
multitude of virtual communities that are more narrowly focused on the range of 
problems/situations that define them.  Along the way, the Web has also spawned a 
multitude of types of artifacts (what our field calls “information”) that come in a seemingly 
increasing number of unpredictable forms.  Our inherited logic (so far at least) seemingly 
lacks the necessary coherency for the managing of these artifacts.  
Another way to describe the Internet and its multi-media offspring, the Web, is the removal 
of many hierarchical or top-down constraints, both in terms of the “means of production” 
(à la Marx) and in terms of centralized organizational/political control (the Web would 
seem to be inherently un-manageable).  This has resulted in an immense and rapid increase 
in the total volume of various types of artifacts.  This will continue as various means by 
which people collaborate freely develop and evolve.  This makes accurately predicting new 
ways of collaborating and what is created in terms of resultant artifacts very difficult (we 
would argue, impossible).  However, the constant of fundamental human behaviors will 
remain.  They will be manifested in different technological ways, yet potentially be more 
exposed than ever before.  The i-field is seemingly the only community seeking profound 
insight into these behaviors through the lens that technology offers—albeit not formally so. 
We argue in this paper that anchoring ourselves in a constantly shifting bed of technology 
and artifacts will not lead to stability or necessarily profound insight into either of these, 
yet the proliferation of ways to communicate and resultant artifacts continues.  This is why 
we believe a more focused and solidified agenda for the i-field based on fundamental 
human behaviors is not only timely, but—most importantly—necessary.  
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